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Abstract—A repair of the Faure–Loidreau (FL) public-key
code-based cryptosystem is proposed. The FL cryptosystem is
based on the hardness of list decoding Gabidulin codes which are
special rank-metric codes. We prove that the recent structural
attack on the system by Gaborit et al. is equivalent to decoding
an interleaved Gabidulin code. Since all known polynomial-time
decoders for these codes fail for a large constructive class of
error patterns, we are able to construct public keys that resist
the attack. It is also shown that all other known attacks fail
for our repair and parameter choices. Compared to other code-
based cryptosystems, we obtain significantly smaller key sizes
for the same security level.
Index Terms—code-based cryptography, rank-metric codes,
interleaving, Gabidulin codes
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Public-key cryptography is the foundation for establishing
secure communication between multiple parties. Traditional
public-key algorithms such as RSA are based on the hardness
of factoring large numbers or the discrete logarithm problem,
but can be attacked in polynomial time once a capable quantum
computer exists. Code-based public-key cryptosystems are
considered to be post-quantum secure, but compared to RSA
their main drawback are significantly larger key sizes.
The Faure–Loidreau (FL) code-based cryptosystem [1], [2] is
based on the problem of reconstructing linearized polynomials
and can be seen as linearized equivalent of the (broken)
Augot–Finiasz cryptosystem [3]. While the Augot–Finiasz
cryptosystem is closely connected to (list) decoding Reed–
Solomon codes, the FL cryptosystem is connected to (list)
decoding Gabidulin codes, a special class of rank-metric
codes [4].
In contrast to McEliece or Niederreiter-type cryptosystems,
where the public key is a matrix, in the FL system, the key is
only a vector, resulting in a much smaller key. At the time when
the FL cryptosystem was designed, it was only conjectured
that Gabidulin codes cannot be list decoded efficiently. As this
was proven recently for many families of Gabidulin codes [5],
[6], the FL system is a very promising post-quantum secure
public-key cryptosystem.
However, there are attacks on the FL cryptosystem: syn-
drome decoding [7], an Overbeck-like attack [8] which can be
avoided by choosing the parameters in a certain way (cf. [2])
and, more severe, the recent attack by Gaborit et al. [9] which
leaves no secure set of parameters of the system.
In this paper, we propose a repair of the FL cryptosystem
and prove that the attack from [9] cannot succeed anymore.
Our fundamental observation is that the attack by Gaborit et
al. [9] on the public key is equivalent to decoding the public
key as an interleaved Gabidulin code to obtain the private key.
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By choosing the public key in a way that the corresponding
interleaved decoder is guaranteed to fail, the system is secured
against attacks as [9].
I I . P R E L I M I N A R I E S
A. Notations
Let q be a power of a prime and let Fq denote the finite
field of order q and Fqm its extension field of order qm. We
use Fm×nq to denote the set of all m × n matrices over Fq
and Fnqm = F
1×n
qm for the set of all row vectors of length n
over Fqm . Further, we use another field extension Fqmu with
u > 1. Thus, Fq ⊂ Fqm ⊂ Fqmu .
Rows and columns of m × n-matrices are indexed by
1, . . . ,m and 1, . . . , n. Denote the set of integers [a, b] =
{i : a ≤ i ≤ b}. By rankq(A) and rankqm(A), we denote the
rank of a matrix A over Fq , respectively Fqm . By Trqmu/qm(a)
denote the Trace operator from an element a ∈ Fqmu to its
projection in Fqm .
Let (γ1, γ2, . . . , γu) be an ordered basis of Fqmu over Fqm
and (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 , . . . , γ
∗
u) its dual basis. By utilizing the vector
space isomorphism Fqmu ∼= Fuqm , we can relate vectors a ∈
Fnqmu to matrices A ∈ Fu×nqm . Similarly, when we consider a
basis of Fqm over Fq , we can represent each vector of length n
in Fqm as an m× n matrix in Fq .
Denote by Ms,q (a) ∈ Fs×nqm the s× n Moore matrix for a
vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ Fnqm of length n, i.e.:
Ms,q (a) =

a1 a2 . . . an
aq1 a
q
2 . . . a
q
n
...
...
. . .
...
aq
s−1
1 a
qs−1
2 . . . a
qs−1
n
 .
If a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ Fqm are linearly independent over Fq , then
rankqm(Ms,q (a)) = min{s, n}, cf. [10, Lemma 3.15].
B. Rank-Metric Codes and Gabidulin Codes
The rank distance between a and b is the rank of the
difference of the two matrix representations:
dR(a,b) , rankq(a− b) = rankq(A−B).
An [n, k, d]Rq code C over Fqm is a linear rank-metric code, i.e.,
it is a linear subspace of Fnqm of dimension k and minimum
rank distance d. For linear codes with n ≤ m, the Singleton-
like upper bound [4], [11] implies that d ≤ n − k + 1. If
d = n− k + 1, the code is called a maximum rank distance
(MRD) code.
Gabidulin codes [4] are a special class of rank-metric codes
and can be defined by its generator matrix as follows: A linear
G(n, k) code over Fqm of length n ≤ m and dimension k is
defined by its k × n generator matrix GG :
GG =Mk,q (g1, g2, . . . , gn)
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where g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) ∈ Fnqm has rankq(g) = n.
Gabidulin codes are MRD codes, i.e., d = n− k + 1, cf. [4].
C. Interleaved Gabidulin Codes
A linear (vertically, homogeneous) interleaved Gabidulin
code IG(u;n, k) over Fqm of length n ≤ m, dimension k ≤ n,
and interleaving order u is defined by
IG(u;n, k) ,


c1
c2
...
cu
 : ci ∈ G(n, k),∀i ∈ [1, u]
 .
When considering random errors of rank weight t, the code
IG(u;n, k) can be decoded uniquely with high probability
up to t ≤ b uu+1 (n − k)c errors, cf. [12]–[14]. However, it
is well-known that there are many error patterns for which
the known polynomial-time decoders fail. In fact, we can
explicitly construct a large class of such errors, see Lemma 2
in Section V-D.
I I I . T H E O R I G I N A L FA U R E – L O I D R E A U S Y S T E M
A. Parameters
Let k, n, w, u be positive integers such that u < k < n and
n− k > w >
⌊
n− k
2
⌋
.
B. Key Generation
1) Choose g ∈ Fnqm at random with rankq(g) = n and let
GG =Mk,q (g). Note that GG is a generator matrix of
a G(n, k) code.
2) Choose x ∈ Fkqmu at random such that {xk−u+1, . . . , xk}
forms a basis of Fqmu over Fqm .
3) Choose s ∈ Fwqmu with rankq(s) = w and an invertible
P ∈ Fn×nq at random. Compute:
z = (s | 0) ·P−1.
The private key is (x, z) (or basically z since x can be
deduced from it) and the public key is (g, k,kpub, tpub) where
kpub = x ·GG + z,
and
tpub =
⌊
n− w − k
2
⌋
.
C. Encryption
Let m = (m1, . . . ,mk−u, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Fkqm be the plaintext.
Note that the upper u coefficients are chosen to be zero in
order to decrypt α. The encryption of m works as follows:
1) Choose α ∈ Fqmu at random.
2) Choose e ∈ Fnqm such that rankq(e) ≤ tpub at random.
3) Calculate the ciphertext c ∈ Fnqm :
c =m ·GG +Trqmu/qm(αkpub) + e.
D. Decryption
1) Compute cP which results in
cP = (m+Trqmu/qm(αx))GGP+(Trqmu/qm(αs)|0)+eP.
2) LetG′ denote the k×(n−w) matrix obtained by removing
the first w columns of GGP and let e′ and c′ denote the
last n− w positions of eP and cP, respectively. Then,
c′ = (m+Trqmu/qm(αx))G′ + e′.
Apply a decoding algorithm on c′. This gives m′ ,
m+Trqmu/qm(αx) and is possible since G′ is a generator
matrix of a G(n− w, k < n− w) code.
3) Since mi = 0 for i = k − u + 1, . . . , k, compute α
by: α =
∑k
i=k−u+1m
′
ix
∗
i , where {x∗k−u+1, . . . , x∗k} is a
dual basis to {xk−u+1, . . . , xk}.
4) Calculate m =m′ − Trqmu/qm(αx).
I V. P U B L I C K E Y A S I N T E R L E AV E D
G A B I D U L I N C O D E
Recall the definition of the public key:
kpub = x ·GG + z,
where x ∈ Fkqmu , GG ∈ Fk×nqm is the generator matrix of a
G(n, k) code, and z ∈ Fnqmu with rankq(z) = w.
Let kpub =
∑u−1
i=0 k
(i)
pubγ
∗
i , z =
∑u−1
i=0 ziγ
∗
i and x =∑u−1
i=0 xiγ
∗
i , where k
(i)
pub, zi,xi have coefficients in Fqm .
Then, we obtain the following representation of the public
key kpub as a u× n matrix in Fqm :
k
(1)
pub
k
(2)
pub
...
k
(u)
pub
 =

x1
x2
...
xu
·GG +

z1
z2
...
zu
 =

x1 ·GG
x2 ·GG
...
xu ·GG
+

z1
z2
...
zu
 .
Since xi ·GG is a codeword of a G(n, k) code, ∀i ∈ [1, u],
this matrix can be seen as a codeword from an IG(u;n, k)
code, corrupted by an error of rank weight w.
V. P O S S I B L E AT TA C K S O N T H E F L S Y S T E M
A. (List) Decoding
An attacker can try to (list) decode either the public key kpub
or the ciphertext c. However, in both cases, the number of errors
that affect the Gabidulin codeword is larger than the unique
decoding radius
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
. Therefore, a list decoding algorithm
with larger decoding radius has to be applied. However, for
many families of Gabidulin codes such an efficient list decoding
algorithm cannot exist [5], [6] and therefore an efficient list
decoding attack (on the public key or the ciphertext) does not
exist.
B. Syndrome Decoding Attack
The ciphertext can be interpreted as a codeword from a code
of dimension k (see [1]), generated by the generator matrix
Mk−u,q (g)
Tr(γ1kpub)
...
Tr(γukpub)
 .
Since the structure of this code only permits decoding like a
random rank-metric code, it can be decoded with the syndrome
decoding attack from [15] whose complexity is in the order
of (n− k)3m3qtpubd (k+1)mn e−m.
C. Gaborit–Otmani–Kalachi Attack
Theorem 1 (GOK Attack [9, Thm. 1]) Let γ1, . . . , γu ∈
Fqmu be a basis of Fqmu over Fqm and let zi = Trqmu/qm(γiz),
for i = 1, . . . u.
If the matrix Z ∈ Fu×nqm with z1, . . . , zu as rows, satisfies
rankqm(Mn−k−w,q (Z)) = w,
then the private key (x, z) can be recovered from GG ,kpub
with O(n3) operations in Fqmu .
D. Interleaved Decoding
Based on the interpretation of Section IV, another possible
attack is to apply a decoder for an interleaved Gabidulin code
to the public key kpub. If w ≤ uu+1 (n − k), such a decoder
will return x with high probability, but fail in certain cases.
Lemma 2 (Interleaved Decoding [12], [13], [16, p. 64])
Let w be an integer with w ≤ uu+1 (n− k) and ci = xi ·GG .
All efficient decoders for IG(u;n, k) codes fail to correct an
error z ∈ Fnqmu with z =
∑u−1
i=0 ziγ
∗
i and rankq(z) = w if
rankqm

Mn−w−1,q (g)
Mn−k−w,q (c1 + z1)
Mn−k−w,q (c2 + z2)
...
Mn−k−w,q (cu + zu)
 < n− 1 (1)
Since rankqm(Mn−w−1,q (g)) = n− w − 1, the interleaved
decoder fails if
rankqm

Mn−k−w,q (z1)
Mn−k−w,q (z2)
...
Mn−k−w,q (zu)
 < w. (2)
Thus, the basic idea of our repair (see Section VI) is to
choose z ∈ Fnqmu such that (2) holds. This makes it impossible
to attack the system by decoding the public key kpub with
an interleaved Gabidulin decoder. To our knowledge, this
connection has not been known before.
E. Equivalence of Attack from [9] and Interleaved Decoding
Theorem 3 The attack from [9] fails if and only if the
attack based on interleaved decoding in Section V-D fails.
In particular, it fails if (2) holds.
Proof: By definition zi = Trqmu/qm(γiz) ∈ Fnqm , i.e.,
z =
∑u−1
i=0 viγ
∗
i , where (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2 , . . . , γ
∗
u) denotes a dual
basis to (γ1, γ2, . . . , γu). The matrix Mn−w−k,q (Z) from
Theorem 1 is row-space equivalent to:
Mn−k−w,q (z1)
Mn−k−w,q (z2)
...
Mn−k−w,q (zu)
 .
The rank of this matrix cannot be come larger than w (since
any vector in the right kernel of this matrix has rank weight
at least n − w [17, Algorithm 3.2.1]). Thus, the failures of
Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, (2) are equivalent.
F. Linearization Attack
Theorem 4 (Linearization Attack [1]) Let k(i)pub =
Trqmu/qm(γikpub) for i = 1, . . . , u and
M =

Mtpub+1,q (c)
−Mtpub+1,q
(
k
(1)
pub
)
...
−Mtpub+1,q
(
k
(u)
pub
)
−Mk+tpub−u,q (g)

. (3)
Then, the encrypted message m can be efficiently recovered if
the left kernel of M has dimension dim(ker(M)) = 1.
If (u + 2)tpub + k > n, then M has at least two more
rows than columns and we have dim(ker(M)) > 1. If kpub is
random and (u+ 2)tpub + k ≤ n, the attack is efficient with
high probability [1]. This implies the following.
Corollary 5 The linearization attack in [1] is inefficient if
tpub >
n−k
u+2 and its work factor is q
m(tpub(u+2)−n+k+1). In
this case, we must choose
w < n− k − 2tpub < uu+2 (n− k).
G. Algebraic Attacks
Faure and Loidreau [1] also described two message attacks
of exponential worst-case complexity. The first one is based
on computing gcds of polynomials of degrees
qm(u−1)
qm(tpub+1) − 1
qm − 1 . (4)
Since computing the gcd of two polynomials can be imple-
mented in quasi-linear time in the polynomials’ degree, (4)
gives an estimate on the work factor of this attack. The
second algebraic attack is based on finding Gröbner bases of
a system of np =
(
n
k+2tpub−u+1
)
many polynomials of degree
approximately dp = q
tpub+1−1
q−1 . The attack is only efficient for
small code parameters, cf. [1, Sec. 5.3]. Since the average-case
complexity of Gröbner bases algorithms is hard to estimate,
we cannot directly relate np and dp to the attack’s work factor.
Faure and Loidreau choose the code parameters such that
np ≈ 232 and dp = 127 and claim that the attack is inefficient
for these values. Our example parameters in Section VIII result
in at least these values.
H. Overbeck-like Attack
The key attack described in [2, Ch. 7, Sec. 2.1] is based on
a similar principle as Overbeck uses to attack the McEliece
cryptosystem based on rank-metric codes [8]. The attack from
[2, Ch. 7, Sec. 2.1] cannot be applied if w ≥ n− k − k−uu−1 .
V I . O U R R E PA I R
We choose n−k− k−uu−1 ≤ w < n−k (i.e., the Overbeck-like
attack is inefficient). Notice that this imposes a rate restriction,
e.g., for u = 3, we get that R & 711 which does not cause any
problem in a code-based cryptosystem.
Our repair is based on choosing z =
∑u−1
i=0 ziγ
∗
i in a way
that
rankqm

Mn−k−w,q (z1)
Mn−k−w,q (z2)
...
Mn−k−w,q (zu)
 , ϕ < w. (5)
In this case, an interleaved decoder, see (2), and therefore also
the attack by Gaborit et al. [9] fails, see Theorem 3.
One possible choice is to set z1 = z2 = · · · = zu
with rankq(z1) = rankq(z) = w. In this case ϕ =
rankqm(Mn−k−w,q (z1)) = n−k−w < w. This is true since
w >
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
, i.e., Mn−k−w,q (z1) has more linearly indepen-
dent elements in the first row than rows. Since w >
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
,
the rank is less than w and an interleaved decoder fails.
In the next section, we will show that the restriction on z
from (5) does not pose a problem in terms of the security level.
In particular, choosing z1 = z2 = · · · = zu with rankq(z1) =
w provides the largest security level among all choices for (5)
and provides an explicit construction of z.
We therefore propose the following modification of the key
generation algorithm which results in z1 = z2 = · · · = zu
with rankq(z1) = rankq(z) = w.
Repair: Replace Step 3 in Key Generation by:
3.) Choose s1 ∈ Fwqm at random with rankq(s1) = w, let
s = s1 ·
∑u−1
i=0 γ
∗
i ∈ Fwqmu and let P ∈ Fn×nq be invertible.
Compute:
z = (s | 0) ·P−1. (6)
All other steps of the algorithms remain the same.
Clearly, we restrict the choice of z in Step 3 of the Key
Generation algorithm. We will see that there are still enough
possibilities for z to preserve a high security level.
V I I . S E C U R I T Y A N A LY S I S
Our repair is designed such that an interleaved decoding
attack and the attack from [9] do not work. In this section, we
analyze the security level resulting from (A.) brute-forcing z,
(B.) searching the kernel of (5), and (C.) the linearization
attack.
Note that guessing α ∈ Fqmu correctly makes it possible
to reconstruct the secret message. Thus, the security of the
system is limited by the number of possible values of α which
is qmu.
A. Number of Possible Vectors z
For the explicit repair of (6) (where ϕ = n − k − w), the
number of matrices s1 ∈ Fwqm with rankq(s1) = w is larger
than 0.288 · qmw, see [17, Lemma 3.13] and the number of
full-rank matrices P ∈ Fn×nq is larger than 0.288 · qn
2
. Thus,
the number of possible vectors z in (6) is larger than:
0.2882 · qmw+n2 .
Since u < n ≤ m, this is usually larger than qmu and trying
all possible z does not reduce the security of the system.
In the general case of (5) (i.e., any n − k − w ≤ ϕ <
w), the number of Moore matrices as in (5) and such that
rankq(z) = w is given from the failure probability of an
interleaved Gabidulin decoder (cf. [13]). The number of such
matrices therefore equals
|z ∈ Fnqmu : rankq(z) = w| · Pf > 0.2882 · qmuw+n
2 · Pf .
However, a lower bound on the failure probability is not known.
As an approximation, we can use Pf ≈ 1/(qm) and therefore
the number of such matrices is larger than 0.2882 · quw+n/m.
This, and the next subsection, make clear that (6) and ϕ =
n− k − w is the most secure way to realize (5).
B. Size of the Solution Space of (5)
Finding the kernel of the matrix in (5) with an interleaved
decoder is equivalent solving a linear system of equations
based on the syndromes with w unknowns and ϕ linearly
independent equations, cf. [16, Section 4.1]. The size of the
solution space of this decoder is (qm)w−ϕ, which is maximized
for the smallest-possible value of ϕ, i.e., ϕ = n− k − w. In
this case the size of the solution space is (qm)2w−(n−k). For
w = b uu+1 (n− k)c, we get:
qm(2b
u
u+1 (n−k)c−(n−k)) ≈ qm(n−k).
Since the size of the solution space is maximal for ϕ = n−
k − w, the explicit repair from (6) is the most secure choice
in this sense.
C. Linearization Attack
Theorem 6 Let M be as in (3). Then, rankqm(M) ≤ ϕ+k+
2tpub − u.
Proof: We can write
k
(i)
pub = Trqmu/qm(γikpub)
= Trqmu/qm(γix) · Mk,q (g) + zi,
so by elementary row operations, we can transform M into
M′ =

Mtpub+1,q (c)
−Mtpub+1,q (z1)
...
−Mtpub+1,q (zu)
−Mk+tpub−u,q (g)
 .
Due to w + 2tpub < n − k, the matrix Mtpub+1,q (zi) is a
sub-matrix of Mn−k−w,q (zi), so
rankqm(M) = rankqm(M
′)
≤ ϕ+ rankqm(Mtpub+1,q (c)) + rankqm(Mk+tpub−u,q (g))
= ϕ+ k + 2tpub − u.
The linearization attack is inefficient if the rank of M is
smaller than its number of rows, which implies the following.
Corollary 7 If ϕ < u(tpub+1) the linearization attack in [1]
is inefficient. This is fulfilled for tpub > n−k−wu + 1 ≥ ϕu + 1,
and there are such values of tpub < n−k−2w for any u > 1.
D. Attack By Moving to Another Close Error
The following attack [18] tries to move the vector z (which
we have chosen such that the interleaved decoder fails) on a
close vector for which the interleaved decoder for kpub does
not fail. Therefore, a vector y ∈ Fu×nqm is needed such that for
z′ , z+ y it holds that rankq(z′) ≤ w and that the rank of
the matrix from (5) over Fqm is at least w.
Nielsen suggested to find such a vector by guessing 2w −
n+ k independent vectors from Fnq which are in the Fq-row
space of z, put them as the first rows of a matrix in Fum×nq
(the remaining rows are zeros) and use its mapping to a matrix
in Fu×nqm as matrix y. That way, z′ is in the row space of z and
rankq(z
′) ≤ w is guaranteed. Further, the rank of the matrix
from (5) over Fqm is increased to w with high probability.
The complexity of this attack is dominated by the complexity
of finding 2w−n+ k independent vectors from Fnq which are
in the Fq-row space of z, i.e.:
WFErr = q(2w−n+k)(n−w).
V I I I . PA R A M E T E R S A N D K E Y S I Z E S
To evaluate the performance of the repaired FL cryptosystem,
it is compared with McEliece’s cryptosystem based on Goppa
codes using list decoding [19], Loidreau’s new rank-metric
code-based encryption scheme [20], [21] and the QC-MDPC
cryptosystem [22]. The most efficient attack on McEliece has
work factor (cf. [19])
WFME = min
{
1
2
(
n
τ
)(
n− k
τ − p
)−1(
k
p
)−1/2
: 0 ≤ p ≤ min{τ, k}
}
operations, where τ is the binary Johnson bound.
The work factor of Loidreau’s system [20], [21] is
WFLoi = m3q(tLoi−1)b(k·min(m,n))/nc,
Table I
C O M PA R I S O N O F T H E M C E L I E C E ( B A S E D O N G O P PA C O D E S ) , T H E L O I D R E A U , O U R R E PA I R E D F L C RY P T O S Y S T E M , A N D T H E
Q C - M D P C S C H E M E
Method q u k n m w τ tLoi λ Security level Rate Key size
McEliece 2 1436 1876 11 41 80.04 0.77 78.98 KB
Loidreau 2 32 50 50 3 3 80.93 0.64 3.60 KB
Repaired FL 2 3 31 61 61 16 90.00 0.46 1.86 KB
QC-MDPC 2 4801 9602 80.00 0.50 0.60 KB
McEliece 2 2482 3262 12 66 128.02 0.76 242.00 KB
Loidreau 2 40 64 96 4 3 139.75 0.63 11.52 KB
Repaired FL 2 3 31 63 63 18 141.56 0.44 1.98 KB
QC-MDPC 2 9857 19714 128.00 0.50 1.23 KB
McEliece 2 5318 7008 13 133 257.47 0.76 1123.43 KB
Loidreau 2 80 120 128 4 5 261.00 0.67 51.20 KB
Repaired FL 2 4 48 82 82 20 262.35 0.54 4.20 KB
QC-MDPC 2 32771 65542 256.00 0.50 4.10 KB
operations, where tLoi · λ =
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
.
By choosing
2 ≤ u <k < n ≤ m,⌊
n− k
2
⌋
<w <
u
u+ 2
(n− k),
n− k − k − u
u− 1 ≤w
the work factors of the attacks on the repaired FL can be
summarized as follows. There are WFα = qmu choices of α,
the syndrome decoding attack requires
WFDec = (n− k)3m3qtpubd
(k+1)m
n e−m
operations [15], the linearization attack has a work factor of
WFLin = qm(utpub+u+1−ϕ),
there are WFz = 0.2882qmw+n
2
possible vectors z, the
interleaved decoding attack needs WFILD = qm(w−ϕ) oper-
ations, the first algebraic attack has a work factor WFAlg =
qm(u−1) q
m(tpub+1)−1
qm−1 and the Overbeck-like attack has com-
plexity at least WFILD.
Table I proposes parameters for expected work factors of
around 280, 2130 and 2260. The work factor of the repaired
FL system stems from the number of operations required
by the most efficient attack which is the attack by moving
to another close error for 280 and the algebraic attack for
2130 and 2260. We observe that in all cases McEliece has
the highest rate followed by Loidreau, FL and QC-MDPC.
The results show further that FL and QC-MDPC require
much smaller key sizes compared to Loidreau and McEliece.
Since public-key cryptosystems are mostly used for encrypting
small data packages (usually they are used to exchange the
private key of a symmetric cryptosystem), small key sizes are
more important than high code rates. The QC-MDPC scheme
gives no guarantee that the ciphertext can be decrypted as
decoding these codes might fail while the repaired FL system
guarantees decryption. Hence, the repaired FL cryptosystem
has advantages compared to the other mentioned systems and
should be considered as an alternative of small key size.
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